Libero arbitrio

Introductio

Freewillisthebelieforphilosophicaltheorythatbelievesthathumanscanchoosetheirownbehavior.

Themainstructurethatconstitutesfreewillincludesmanyaspects.Forexample,inthecategoryofreligion,freewillmaymeananalmighty“god”oramysteriouspowerthatdoesnotcontroltheindividual’swillandChoice;inethics,freewillmaymeanthatindividualsaremorallyresponsiblefortheiractions;inpsychology,itmeansthatthemindcontrolspartofthebody'sactions;inthefieldofscience,freewillmaymeantheactionsofthebody,includingthebrainInner,incompletenessisdeterminedbyphysicalcauseandeffect.

Quantummechanicsdoesnotsupportfreewill,butmatterhasuncertaintiessuchasprobabilitywaves,butitstillhasastableobjectivelaw,doesnotdependonhumanwill,deniesfatalism,andthemicroworldconstitutesthemacroworld.First,thereisstillaninsurmountabledistancebetweentherandomnessonthemicro-scaleandthemacro-scaleintheusualsense.Second,itisdifficulttoprovewhetherthisrandomnessisirreducibleornot.Thingsarecombinedbyindependentevolution.Thereisadialecticalrelationshipbetweencontingencyandnecessityindiversityasawhole.

Theexistenceoffreewillhasalwaysbeenacoreissueinthehistoryofphilosophyandscience.

Freewill(English:Freewill)doesnothaveadefinitionthatisrecognizedbyallparties.Thedefinitionoffreewillinphilosophyisnotunified;andthe"freewill"thatpeopletalkaboutineverydaylifeisdifferentfromthe"freewill"understoodbythejudicialandpsychologicalcircles.Inthebroadestsense,freewillistheabilityofpeopletodecidewhethertodosomethingaccordingtotheconditionstheyhave.

Philosophicalpointofview

BaruchSpinoza(BaruchSpinoza)comparesthefreewillofhumanbeingstoastonethatthinkshehaschosentheflightpathandlandingpoint."Ethics",hewrote,"Ifthemind’sdecisionisdeductedfromdesire,nothingremains.Itwillchangewithvariousarrangements.Thereisnoabsolutevalueorfreewillinthemind.Themind’swillisdeterminedbyonefactor.Thisfactorisdeterminedbyanotherfactor,andthenanother,andthenanother,anditlastsindefinitely.Peoplewillbelievethattheyarefreebecausetheyunderstandtheirownwillanddesiresandignorethecontributingfactors."

ArthurSchopenhauer(ArthurSchopenhauer),echoingSpinoza,wrote,"Everyonebelievesthatheisinherentlycompletelyfree,evencoveringpersonalactions,andthatatanytimehecanstartanotherAwayoflife....Thedayaftertomorrow,fromexperience,hewillbesurprisedtofindthatheisnotfree,butsubjecttonecessities,andregardlessofallhisdetermination,hecannotchangehisbehavior,andthisistheresultofhislifeFromthebeginningtotheendofthelife,hemustplaytheroleofhisowncondemnation..."

FriedrichSchiller(FriedrichSchiller)proposedamethodtosolvethisdilemmainhisAestheticEducationTablets,LuRudolfSteinerexploresthisinmoredepthinhisphilosophyoffreedom.Bothphilosophersbelievethatpersonalwillisinitiallyunfree,regardlessofwhethereachperson’sbehaviorisbasedonreligious,ethical,ormoralprinciples,orappearstobecompletelyrationalfromacertainstandpoint,orseemstobecompletelydrivenbynaturaldesiresormotives..Schillerproposedthatthesolutionistofindaplayablebalancebetweenthetwoextremesofrationalprinciplesandphysicaldesires.Wheneveryoneisfreetomovebetweendifferentmotivesorimpulses,theycandiscoverwhatSteinercalledwithoutrestraint.Moralimagination,oranunderstandingofthecontextualdependenceofhigherintentions.Therefore,freewillisnotanaturalstate,itcanbeobtainedfromself-reflectionandplayableconsciousness.

Barond'Holbach, a "harddeterminist" suchasd'Holbach, incompatiens est qui credit interminato mandre liberum arbitrium." Libertariani" ut Thomas Reid (ThomasReid), PetervanInwagen (PetervanInwagen) and RobertKane(RobertKane) are incompatible theorists qui inesse putant.

Otherphilosophersarguethatdeterminismiscompatiblewithfreewill.These"compatibilityists",suchasThomasHobbes,usuallyarguethatonlywhenaperson’sactionsarethatperson’sownWanttodoit,andyoucanassumethattherecanbeotherwaysdependingontheperson'sdecision,andthatperson'sactionsareconsideredfree.Inexplainingthisimportantproviso,DavidHumewrote,“Thishypotheticalfreedomisallowedtobeownedbyeveryoneintheworldexceptforprisonerswhoarelockedinchains.”Compatibilityistsoftenpointtofreewill.Obviouslydeprivedcases-suchasrape,murder,theft,etc.Thefocusofthesecasesisnotthatthepastdeterminesthefuture,butthattheattackerscornsthevictim'swillingnessandpreferenceforhisownbehavior.Theattacker"forces"thevictim,andthenaccordingtothecompatibilists,thisisthecontemptforfreewill.Therefore,theyarguethattheexistenceofdeterminismisnotimportant.Whatisimportantisthateachperson'schoiceistheresultoftheirownwishesandpreferences,andisnotdespisedbysomeexternal(oreveninternal)forces.Tobeacompatibilityist,apersondoesnotneedtoacknowledgeanyspecificconceptoffreewill,justdenythatdeterminismconflictswithfreewill.

Alia sententia est quod haec sententia liberi arbitrii est secundum Hobbes, 'absurdlingua', quia liberum genus potentiae per voluntatem definitur;

Anotherquestionhasalsoemergediswhethertheactionwithfactorscanbefreeandtheactionwithoutfactorscanbecomewill.Thismakesfreewillacontradictoryrhetoric.Somecompatibilistsadvocatetheaforementionedfreedom.Thelackofafoundationfortheconceptofwillistobearatleastpartoftheresponsibilityforthecognitiveconflictbetweendeterminismandliberalism.Fromthepointofviewofcompatibilityists,theuseoffreewillbyincompatibilityistsmaybeclassifiedasemotionallanguage.

Religiousviewpoint

Theologicalviewpoint

Intheologicalviewpoint,"God"isnotonlyomniscientbutalsoomnipotent;infact,somepeople,bothChristiansandnon-ChristiansBelievingin"God"notonlyalwaysknowswhatchoicesanindividualwillmake,infact"God"alsodeterminesthesechoices.Inotherwords,theybelievethatthroughhisabilitytoforesee,heknowswhatwillaffectindividualchoices,andthroughhisalmightyability,hecancontrolthesefactorsthataffectchoices.Thiskindofthinkingbecomesextremelyimportanttotheconceptsrelatedto"salvation"and"fate",becauseneitherconceptcanbeseparatedfromthiskindofthinking.Anothergroupofpeoplebelievesthatwhen"God"isomnipotentandknowswhatchoicestheindividualwillmake,hewillstillgivetheindividualtheabilitytomakethefinalchoiceorrejecteverything,andanychoiceitselfisinherentlyorTheexternalconditionsareirrelevant.

Thedoctrineofdivineforeknowledgeintheologyoftencontradictstheconceptoffreewill.Afterall,ifGoddoesknowwhatisgoingtohappenandknowsallthechoicesapersonwillmake,thenitmaybequestionabletoregardthischoiceasanexpressionoffreedom,thatis,ifGodknowsoralwaysknowsoneAperson'srealchoice,thenthisseemstodistortaperson'sfreedom.Thisquestionisinfactrelatedtothequestionofaristotelis’snavalbattle:willorwilltherebenonavalbattletomorrow?Iftherewillbeanavalbattle,thenyesterday'sassumptionistrue,theninthepast,thisnavalbattleisboundtohappen.Iftherewillbenonavalbattle,thenitcanbeunderstoodthatforthepast,thisbattlewillinevitablynothappen.Thismeansthatnomatterwhatthefutureoutcomeis,thefutureisbasedonthetruthofthepast-thistruthistheassumptionofthepastforthefuture.However,somephilosophersbelievethatnecessityandpossibilityaredefinedasreferencepointsofanenvironmentalmediumknownintimeorexperience.Ifsomethingisonlypossibleforanobserver’spointofview,thenperhapsitwillIntermsofit,itisinevitable.Somephilosophersbelievethatfreewillisequivalenttohavingasoul.Therefore,accordingtosomeargumentsthatanimalshavenosouls,theydonothavefreewill.However,theprerequisiteforthisargumentisthatwemustfirstprovethatanimalshavenosouls.Jewishphilosophyemphasizesthatfreewillistheessenceofthehumansoul,sotheword"neshama"derivedfromtheroot"nshm???"inHebrewfor"breathing"representsthesoul.

Christianitas

MedievalChristianitasoncefacedaquestion:Doesmanhavefreewill?Thegospelsays:"Agoodmanradiatesgoodwillfromthegoodnessstoredinhisheart,andawickedmanradiatesevilfromtheevilstoredinhisheart".ApersonwhodoesgoodoreviliscompletelyattributabletowhetherhehaslistenedtothegospelintheBibleandtheteachingofJesusChrist;hehasnoknowledgeofgoodandevil,andthereforedoesnothavetheabilitytofreelychoosetodogoodorevil;needsWithreferencetoahigherwill,thatis,thewillofJesusChrist,healoneisanabsolutelygoodwill,whichistheauthoritativestandardofallwills.Therefore,thelastformoffreewillleftbyChristianitasisfaithorunbelief.

AndChristianitasattributedthelatterwilltothetemptationofthedevilSatan,sointhisview,humanfreewillcanonlyexistintwodiametricallyopposedareasoftrustinginGodorfollowingthetemptationofthedevil.oneofthem.Thismeansthattherearetwotypesoftruespiritualpursuits,andhumanfreewillcanonlywanderinoneofthem.Accordingtothemeaningofthe"Bible",whenapersonisstillintherealmofsinwhenhehasnotheardofChrist.

"Quia iam determinant bona, sed non possunt. Ergo I don't bonum quod volo. Idon't do the evil in want'." Bea persona, si confidis in Deo, non habeas liberum arbitrium in se. Dicendum, quod in Christianitate non est visio liberi arbitrii.

Catholicism

FreewillisextremelyimportanttoCatholicism.SaintAugustineandSaintThomaswerethemainearlyadvocates.Catholicism'semphasisonfreewillandgratitudemaybecontrastedwithProtestantthinking,especiallyafterthecounter-reformation.CatholicismtakesThomasAquinas'sideasasorthodox,andtheProtestantReformationmovementrediscoveredandresurrectedAugustine'sideasinsomerespectsandopposedtheCatholicposition.Protestanttheologians,especiallyMartinLutherandCalvin,believethattheCatholicpositiondeniestheinheritedtendencytowardevilinhumannature.TheyespeciallyhighlightedAugustine'sconceptoflaydesires,andexpresseditasacompletecorruption.Theyarguedthatsinisfarmorethanadefectandlackofhumannature,butthecorruptionanddegenerationoftheentirehumannature.Noaspectorabilityofhumanexistenceisnotcorruptedbycrime.Therefore,althoughmanwascreatedintheimageofGod,hehaslostthisimageinthefall.Luthercommented:"Humanshaveadisturbed,corruptedandpoisonednatureinthebodyandsoul.Thereisnothinggoodabouthumanbeings.Thisismyheartfeltopinion.AnyonewhoadvocatesthathumanfreewillcanFreetodosomethingaboutsacredthings,eventhesmallestthing.SuchpeopledenyChrist.Inmywork,especiallyagainstoneofthemostlearnedpeopleintheworldInthewritingsofErasmus,Ihavealwaysinsistedonthisview."

Islam

FromtheinterpretationoftheQuran,IslambelievesthatGodisall-knowingandomnipotent.HeConstantlyknoweverything.Thetraditionalfreewillhereisstilltomakepeoplerealizethattheymustberesponsibleforhiswordsanddeeds.Itisalsomentionedinthescriptures:"Nooneshouldbeartheburdenofothers."

Buddhismus

Buddhismusdoesnotemphasizefreewill.AccordingtotheexplanationofDependentOrigination,basedontheexistenceofthewholeworldisacombinationofcauseandcondition,thereisactuallynoabsolutefreedom;inaddition,anotherimportantdoctrineinBuddhismusisthatthereisnoself.Differentindividualsarejusttheaggregationofthefiveaggregatesofcauseandconditionanddonotexist.Aconstantself.Therefore,ingeneral,sincefreedomisnotabsoluteandwillisnotconstant,freewillisnotanimportantconceptforBuddhismus.ItshouldbeclearthattheBuddhaallowedhismonksfreedomofactionandthought,butthisdoesnotnecessarilyextendtotheconceptoffreewill.CausalityisthecentraldogmaofBuddhists.Thisistheso-calleddependentorigininBuddhistterms,whichispartofthetheoryofkarma.IsaBuddhistalibertarianoradeterminist?Thisisaspeciousquestion,anditseemsthattheansweriscorrectanyway.Ontheonehand,Buddhistsareofcourselibertarians.Theso-calledevilisrewarded.Buddhistswillneveradmitthatapersondoesevilbecauseofvariousreasonsotherthanhimandbeforethathemustdoevil.Ifthisisthecase,thereisnothingelse.Thosewhochoosetodoevilhavenoreasontobearretribution,andkarmarebirthisthebasicdoctrineofBuddhismus.Ontheotherhand,Buddhistsareofcoursedeterminists,anduniversalcauseandeffectarethedoctrinesadheredtobyanyschoolofBuddhismus.Otherwise,theoriginofkarmacannotbeestablished,andthe“emptiness”thatisthefundamentalcharacteristicofBuddhismuscannotbementioned.Predecessorshavenoticedthisproblemlongago.RussianTh.StcherbatskypointedoutthatthetheoryofspecialcausesinBuddhismus(thatis,thetheoryoftwelvekarma)wascreatedbytheBuddhahimself,anditspurposeistodefendfreewill.Opposeacompletelydeterministicattitude.ButasthereincarnatedBuddha'sfamilymember,hedidnotadmitthathehadfreewill.Hesaid:"Karmahasthreekarma,body,mouth,andmind.Thefirsttwokarmadependsonmindkarma,andmindkarmadependsonunspeakableconditionsofcauseandcondition."

Famousdiscourse

AncientGreece

TheancientGreeksconductedtheinitialresearchonhumanfreewill.Socratesbelievesthatman'sfreewillisessentiallygood,becauseonlygoodthingsaregoodforhim,andevilthingsmakehimsuffer.Thereasonwhyapersonwantstodoevilisonlybecausehethinksitisgood.Aslongasheknowsthatitisevil,hewillnottaketheinitiativetodoevil.Therefore,inordertoachievegoodness,thekeyisnottolimitpeople'sfreewill,buttoteachpeoplewhatknowledgeofgoodnessis;asforthewilltodogood(virtue)itself,itisinherentinpeopleandcannotbetaughtortaught.Protagorabelievesthatinordertomaintainsociallife,peoplehavetoassumethateveryonehasthefreewillofmoralityandjustice.Infact,ifthereisnoexternalcoercionandeducation,thenpeoplewill"onlyhavesomeoppositevices,"Andyoucannotbecomeagoodpersonbyyourownfreewill.Slamakoputitmoreclearly:"Thereasonwhyhumanbeingscondemninjusticeisnotbecausetheyrefusetodoit,butbecausetheyfearthattheywillbecomethevictimofinjustice.Fromthispointofview,Socrates,injusticeIfitbecomesagreatinjustice,itcanbemorepowerful,freer,andmoreproactivethanjustice.”Inotherwords,aslongasapersoncanavoidbecomingavictimofothers'evilorhisownevil,hewilltryhisbesttodoevil,becauseitisagainsthim.favorable.

Spinoza

WhenSpinozadissolvesGodintonatureitselfinapantheisticway,manusesreasontocontrolhisownlustaccordingtoGod’swill.Theprincipleof"heteronomy"hasbeentransformedintoamodelof"self-discipline":theintellectitselfassumesthefullresponsibilityofcontrollingeroticdesires.Thewillthatcomesfromrationalthinking.Thisisakindofrational"decision",whichisstillfreewillinthesenseofgettingridofexternalauthorityandnaturalinstinct,butitisnotpresentedascontingencylikeinstinctiveimpulseandarbitrarydespotismof"God",butakindofinevitability..Spinoza’srationalismregardshumanintellectasthe“upperlimit”ofself-disciplinedethics,andmakesreasonthetranscendentsubjectofpersonalityperformers.Asthesubject’stranscendenceisonlyaone-timemanifestationofreasonEmotionaltranscendence,withoutbecominganinfiniteself-transcendence,this"upperlimit"hastobesurpassedbyahighersubject,ititselfbecomesthe"lowerlimit",andtheinneractivesouldescendsintoanoutermask.Britishempiricistphilosophers(andFrenchmaterialists)regardpeople'sspontaneousemotionsanddesiresasthe"lowerlimit"ofself-disciplinedethics.Whattheydiscussisnothowthesubjectdominatesthemask,buthowthemaskexpressesthesubject.Spinozastartedfromthehighestprincipleofdenyingfreedom(intellect)andaccommodatedallthespontaneousdesiresofman’sfreewill,soheadmiredthereasonablepoliticalsystemofthedemocraticrepublic;Hobbesstartedfromthelowestspontaneousdesireofman.Proceedingfromsexualdesire,theyarguedtheonlyrighttosuppressallfreedomandadvocatedanextrememonarchy:thetwoofthemmarkedthetwoendsoftheperformancestagefortheethicsofself-discipline.

Kant

ThemostimportantpointofalltheworkofKant'sphilosophyistodistinguishthelawoffreedomfromthelawofnatureanddeterminetherelationshipbetweenthetwo.Hebelievesthattruefreedomisconsideredtomeanthatinthesenseofmoralpractice,peoplehavefreewillthatisnotboundbynaturallaws,freefromphysicalinstinctsandactaccordingtotheirownlegislation,andhumanreasonestablishestheinevitablelawsofnatureintermsofobjects.Makesone'sownfreedomrestricted;inpractice,thesamereasonofmanisnotboundbythelawsofnature,butactsinaccordancewiththeuniversallawofitsownconsistentfreewill.Manisstillcompletelyfreeinthefaceofallnaturalinevitability.Heiscompletelyfreetodothingsaccordingtothemorallaw(absoluteorder).Heisveryclearinhisheartwhathe“should”do,andonlyifhedoesthatcanhetrulybeafreeman..Thisself-determinedlawisself-discipline.

Thisuniversallawoffreewill(theso-called"absoluteorder")isexpressedinthreedifferentlevelsinKant.Thefirstexpressionisthemostsuperficial,andistoestablishthelawoffreedomofwillthroughananalogywiththelawofnature:"Youwanttoactlikethis,justastheprincipleofyouractionshouldbecomeauniversallawofnaturethroughyourwill."Twoformsofexpression:"Ifyouwanttoactlikethis,youwillalwaysusethehumanityofyourpersonalityandthehumanityofeveryoneelse'spersonalityasanendatthesametime,notjustasameans."Thethirdformofexpression:"Thewillofeveryrationalbeingistheideaof​​thewillofuniversallegislation.”Kant’sfirststatementemphasizesthatfreewill,asapurposebehaviorwithnaturalcausaleffects,isbasedonitsuniversality.Afterall,thisuniversalityisdiscoveredthroughitsnaturaleffects(everyone’sresponseaccordingtotheirinterests),whichacknowledgesthatempiricalethicsequatesfreewillwithsubjectivedesirefortheoreticalreasons,butatthesametimerevealsTheirfundamentalmisunderstandingsandconfusions;thesecondstatementemphasizesthatthepurposeoffreewillisauniversalandconsistentpurpose,whichisalwaysvalidforoneself,forothers,andregardlessofthesituationoftheworldofexperience.,Thusexpressingthetranscendenceoftheprincipleofself-discipline,whichrecognizesthattheoreticalethicsequatesfreewillwiththeobjectiveuniversalcoercivelawandthatpeople’sunderstandingofthislawalsohastheoreticalreasons,butitalsopointsoutTheyalsoconfuseself-disciplineandnaturallaw.Asforthethirdstatementhere,itisasynthesisofempiricistandrationalethics.Thisexpressionmeansthatmorallawsarenotexternalmandatoryrequirements,norareoneperson’srequirementsforanother(orotherpeople),buteachperson’sownspontaneousrequirements,nomatterhowlowaperson’sstatusorqualityis.Howbad,aslongasheisrational,thatis,aslongasheisaperson,hehastheabilitytoimposeuniversalmorallawsonhimself,andhehastheminimumdignityasaperson.

aristotelis

Plato’s"idealstate"hasshownthatthe"reification"offreewillwillinevitablyleadtotheobliterationoffreewill;aristotelisThentheuncertaintyofindividualfreewillandtherighttochoosearerestored.Hesaid:"Somoralitydependsonourselves,andwickednessdependsonourselves.Becausewehavetherighttodothings,andwealsohavetherightnottodo.Wherewecansay'no',wecanalsosay'yes'.Ifitlieswithustodonoblethings,itisalsowithusnottodoshamefulthings;ifitiswithusnottodonoblethings,thenitalsolieswithustodoshamefulthings.”Undoubtedly,doinggoodisnotonlydoinggood,butitisnotitself.Doingevilisnotjustdoingevil,itisalsonotdoinggood.Freewilltodoonethingisinherentlytwo-sided:todothisbutnotthat,sofreewillmustbeachoice,thatis,oneofthetwo.Sincepeoplehavethefreewilltodogood,theymustalsohavethefreewilltodoevil,andviceversa."Doingevilisvoluntary",thiscannotevenbedefendedbySocrates'"ignorance".Because,ifyoudon’twanttodoevil,whydon’tyounotimproveyourknowledge?Ifyoufallintoasituationwhereyouhavetodoevil,thenyoustillfallintoitvoluntarilyatfirst,becauseyouhavethefreedomnottofallintothissituation.Thisrevealsthatthewilltofreelychoosebetweengoodandevilistherootofallgoodandevilbecominggoodandevil.Indeed,ifpeoplearedestinedtobegood,thereisnorealgood;ifpeoplearedestinedtobeevil,thenthereisnoneedtopunishthewicked.Peoplecondemnevilbecauseitcoulddogood.Butaristotelis'sviewseemscomprehensive,buthestillencountersthecontradictionbetweenwillandknowledge,aswellasmotivationandeffect.Socrateshaspointedoutthatifthereisnocorrectinstructionandguidance,asubjectivelykindwillislikelytoleadtobadconsequences.aristotelisalsoadmittedthat“virtueisobeyingtheguidanceofproperreason;”buthealsobelieves:“Thebehaviorandstateofthecharacterarenotthesamestyleofvoluntary;becausewecanonlyunderstandthespecialfacts.Onlywhenwearethemastersofourbehaviorscanwealwaysbethemastersofourbehaviors;butthedevelopmentofcharacterorhabit,liketheoccurrenceofdisease,isalsogradual,step-by-step,andunnoticeable;therefore,weareonlyatthebeginningofourhabitsIt’sthemaster.

Moralresponsibility

Societygenerallybelievesthatpeopleareresponsiblefortheiractions,andtheywillpointoutthattheperson’sactionsshouldbepraisedandcriticized.However,manypeopleTheconceptofrighteousresponsibilityisinseparablefromfreewill.Inotherwords,itistheabilitytomakeotherchoices.Therefore,whetheranindividualmustbemorallyresponsible,andwhyitisornot,becomesanotherimportantissue.

Incompatibilityistsaremorelikelytothinkthatdeterminismandmoralresponsibilityareincompatiblewitheachother.Afterall,onecannotberesponsibleforwhomonemustberesponsibleforabehaviorthatcanbepredictedfromthebeginning.HardlinedeterminismsupporterssaytheoppositeGeo-compatibilityistsarguethatdeterminismisa"prerequisite"formoralresponsibility-societycannotbelievethatapersonmustbeheldresponsibleunlesshisbehaviorisdeterminedbysomething;insimpleterms,itisonlyoneWhenbehaviorisdeterminedbyacertainreason,thereisareasontoasksomeonetoberesponsibleforthismatter.ThisargumentcanbetracedbacktothethinkingoftheeighteenthcenturyphilosopherDavidHume,anditwasalsoanarchyinthesecondhalfofthecentury.Theist:WilliamGodwinstillusesit.Intheend,ifindeterminismistrue,thenthoseundecidedeventshappenrandomly.Thenthereisaproblem,ifapersonburstsoutofnowherebecauseofacertainstimulusInhisbody’snervoussystem,isitpossibleforpeopletoaffirmorpunishacertainbehaviorcausedbythenervoussystem?TheyretortthatapersonmustshowthatheisaboutHowmuchofthisbehaviorisduetohispersonaldesiresandpreferences,orthe"character"ofthisperson.Someliberalistsrespondedtothis,andnon-deterministicactionsdidnothappencompletelyrandomlyandarbitrarily,andbelievedthattheseItisbecausethechoiceofindependentwillisnotdeterminedinadvance.Thisargumentisnotperfectforthebroadacademiccommunity,becauseitonlyreturnstheproblemtoastateofunresolved,whichisverystrangeinmetaphysics.Anotherweirdconcept-nothingcanbemadeoutofnothing.

St.Paul,inhis"Romans"asksaboutmoralresponsibility:"DoesthepotterhavenoauthoritytotakeapieceofmudfromalumpofmudandmakeavaluableAndmakeanotherpieceofitasahumblevessel?"Accordingtothisview,eveniftheindividual’sbehaviorisfundamentallydeterminedbyGod,hewillstillbeblamedforthatbehavior.

Asimilarviewisthattheindividual’smoralsinoriginatesfromPersonalcharacter,thatis,apersonwithamurderercharacterwillinevitablykillandwillstillbepunished,becausethereisnothingwrongwithpunishingsomeonewithabadcharacter.

TheconceptofmoralresponsibilityalsoassumesThismeansthatapersonisessentiallythesameexceptforphysicalandmentalchanges.Therefore,52-year-oldStanleyWilliamswillbeexecutedforthecrimecommittedby28-year-oldStanleyWilliams.

Scientificresearch

Thebrainmakes decisionsbeforeus

From: "NewDiscovery"December2005issue

Thebrain iam ante "voluntatis" informationem hanc edixit ut certum opus praeciperet... et hoc factum non est cognitum! Anamazing indagat, ut habeat, examinare "libertatem" conceptum "voluntatis".

Sittingonthebeach,youhavejustenjoyedthelastsunsetoftheholiday.Tomorrowyouwillpackyourbagsandreturntowork.Therefore,evenifthesunsetisalreadywest,Youstillreluctanttogiveup.Timegoesbyeveryminute,andyouarestillinthelastfewminutes,enjoyingthelastholidaycomfort.Finally,thereisamomentwhenyoudecidetostandupandleavethefascinatingbeach.ButObviously,thefactthatyoudecidedtostandupatacertainmomentdidnotconveytoyourconsciousnessatthesametime.But,knowthatyouhavewantedtodosomething...andwhatyouaregoingtodo.,Thebrainhasmadeadecisionafewthousandthsofasecondago,butyouhavenoideaaboutthedecision.Thatistosay:theactivityofthebrainiscompletelyindependentofconsciousness(here,"consciousness"isdefinedasAndtheperceptionofaction).Inaddition,thebrainhasbeguntostimulatethenecessary"brainareas"andisreadytoact.

PatrickHaggard,aneurobiologistattheUniversityofLondon,UK,in2005ThisviewwasdiscussedmoreclearlyinJuneof2008.HemadethisconclusionafterstudyingtheresultsofexperimentsconductedbyneurobiologistsintheUnitedStates,France,andtheUnitedKingdomfromthe1980sto2004.Theseexperimentsweredesignedtoclarifythecurrentsituation.Whenwedecidetodoacertainaction,thebrain’sactivitymechanism.ProfessorPatrickHaygardexplained:“Usually,peoplebelievethatwhendoingacertainaction,forexample,whenit’scold,stretchyourarmstofetchclothes,wedothisactionBecausewewanttodoit.However,thisideaiswrong.Wantingtoperformacertainactionfirstoccursindependentlyinacertainareaof​​thebrain,andthenwejustperceivethewillingnesstoperformacertainaction,andthenwedothisaction."Moreprecisely,ontheonehandweareveryclearlyawareofthemotiveoftheaction,ontheotherhandwecannotchoosetheprecisetimetoperformthisaction.

Thepinnacleofmentalactivity

Wecanassertthatthosewhoareonvacationwillleavethebeachasexpectedsoonerorlater,buttheydon’tknowtheminuteorsecondoftheaction,becausethisdecisionisunknown,sowesayOurfreewill,thefacultythatactsaccordingtoourownwill,isnotasimportantaswethink.Thisviewchallengestheancientphilosophythathasahistoryofcenturies,anditcanevenbesaidtobeaninsulttophilosophicalviews.WhatisthebasisforK.Heigarde’spointofview?ObviouslyhisconclusionisbasedonanexperimentconductedbyAngelaSirigu,aneurobiologistattheLyonInstituteofCognitiveSciencesin2004.Theexperimentisverysimple,only15volunteerparticipantsarerequired:theysitaroundatableequippedwithbuttons,andwhentheythinktheyshouldpressthebutton,theywillreceiveanordertoact.However,theexperimenthascertainlimitations:Atthemomenttheydecidetoact,wehavetorecordthepointerpositionoftheclockspeciallydesignedforthisexperiment(thepointerrotatesfor2.46seconds).Duringthisperiod,theelectronicactivityoftheirbrainisrecordedbyEEGtechnology(byinstallinginElectroderecordsabovetheirheads)inordertodecipherthemomentofthebeginningof"potentialmotivationpreparation":thesuddenincreaseinneuronelectricwavesindicatesthatthebrainisstartingtoactandisreadytopressthebutton.Thisistherealmomentwhenthebraindecidestoact.

Freeconsciousactionistoknowthecommandofthebrain

ProfessorHeigardecommented:"Thisstudyshedslightonthisphenomenonforthefirsttime.Suchaconclusionneedstobeconfirmedatthetime.Becauseitnotonlyshockedthescientificandphilosophicalcircles,butitalsoquestionedwhattheconceptof‘freewill’means,somanypeoplearelookingforwardtoastrongevidence."

Ifphilosophicalcircleshavealwaysbeenobsessedwiththisconcept,butneurobiologyhasmadeamajorbreakthroughinthisarea,theyhaverealizedtheunconsciousnessofthebrain'sconsciousorganstoactions.Thatistosay,"Wanttodo"Anactionisjustaresultofthebrainissuingacommandwithoutknowingit!AngelaSiriguexplained:"Lookatthereactioninsidethebrainwhentheagentdecidestopressthebutton!"Weseethateverythingbeginswithanunconsciousbrainmovementprogram.Theprefrontalareaof​​thecerebralcortex(locatedabovetheeyes)haspreviouslystoredacommandtotouchabuttonatacertainmoment,whichstimulatestheparietalcortex.Theparietalcortexislocatedintheupperposteriorpartoftheskull.Oneofthefunctionsofthisareaistosuperviseandmanagetheexecutionoforiginalcommands.Theparietalcortexrespondswhenthemotorcortextouchesthebuttonaccordingtothecommand.

Inanycase,freewillstillplaysadecisiverole.Themorecomplexdecisionsmadebyoneperson,twopeople,oreventhecollectivecomefromdeliberatedeliberateparticipation.Atthispoint,freewillplaysadecisiverole.

Ifthebehavioroffreewillisreducedtolearningthedecisionmadebythebrain,doesthismeanthatwehavetoobeythebrain'schoice?Notatall!